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I

Reviewed by David S. Caudill, Villanova University School of Law, Pennsylvania

n the months prior to the 2012 presidential election, some of those who
read Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ (USCCB) guide to voting, undoubtedly felt
uncomfortable. Does a Catholic search in vain for the pro-life, family values
candidate determined to protect the poor, the rights of workers, and God’s
creation? Or, does he or she become a single-issue voter, ignoring paragraph
42 (“As Catholics we are not single-issue voters”) but following the spirit of
the USCCB guide? As Notre Dame Law Professor Cathleen Kaveny describes:
Nowhere does the document straightforwardly allow a conscientious
voter to select a pro-choice candidate if there is a pro-life candidate
in the race. In contrast, on numerous occasions [it] affirms the decision to refuse to cast a vote for a pro-choice candidate, even if the only
alternative is to refrain from voting altogether…[T]he issues [are]
lexically ordered: First consider abortion and then consider everything
else. (p. 197)
Law’s Virtues is a courageous, well-reasoned analysis of current issues at
the intersection of religion, morality, and law. Kaveny wades into our divisive
political environment and faces head-on the ongoing controversy over how
Christians should try to influence the laws of a pluralistic, democratic nation. Published on the eve of the 2012 election, Law’s Virtues nevertheless will
serve as a primer for the next few election cycles. For readers who firmly side
with the targets of her criticism, Kaveny’s book may have little impact other
than to draw ire. But for readers who want to reflect pragmatically on difCatholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice, Vol. 17, No. 1, September 2013, 214-217.
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ficult questions of faith and law, Kaveny’s arguments are both compelling and
helpful.
The hint that Law’s Virtues will be pragmatic—and not idealistic—is
found in the preface’s epigram, a 17th-century quotation from Isidore of
Seville:
Law should be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom
of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for
no private benefit, but for the common good. (p. xi; emphasis added)
In the chapters that follow, Kaveny rejects both the view that law should
be morally neutral—because law inevitably (in its pedagogical function)
teaches moral lessons—and the view that law should enforce morality—
because there are too many moral disagreements even among and within
different religious communities. Kaveny also rejects the law-as-police-officer,
or “negative constraints” image of law, instead seeing law as a positive force
in creating the conditions of autonomy (which promote freedom to shape
one’s life), and in leading “men and women to virtue in order to promote the
common good” (p. 29; citing Aquinas, Summa theologica, I-II, q. 91 art. 4). Kaveny offers the Civil Rights Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as examples of law’s moral pedagogy,
and, significantly, as illustrations of the limits of law. For example, the ADA
“communicates a normative vision…[but] it does not attempt to immediately
realize each and every element of that vision by using the coercive force of
law” (p. 36). That is, legislators must “consider how [a] law will actually function” (p. 46), which entails a practical evaluation alongside considerations of
cost and public support.
The centerpiece of Law’s Virtues (chapters 3–7) is Kaveny’s detailed legal analysis of life issues in courts and legislatures (i.e., abortion, the failed
Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA), genetic information, and assisted suicide).
With respect to assisted suicide, Kaveny acknowledges that “thoughtful
Americans of goodwill have a range of opinions,” but she highlights the
“danger of coercion or the risk of manipulating vulnerable patients to ‘choose’
death prematurely” (p. 180). As to genetic information, Kaveny worries about
relying on probabilistic information to make decisions about one’s life or
one’s child’s life. Moreover, FOCA is Kaveny’s example of a law, in Isidore
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of Seville’s terms, which is not clearly expressed, leading to uncertainty and
misunderstanding. Most importantly, in light of the realities that women
with low incomes constitute the majority of abortions, that women who want
abortions will find a way to obtain them, and that women facing crisis pregnancies are “only slightly less vulnerable” than the unborn, we should attend
to Pope John Paul II’s insight that the “underlying causes of attacks on life
have to be eliminated, especially by ensuring proper support for families and
motherhood” (p. 89; quoting Evangelium vitae, para. 90). Ending abortion
and increasing social support go hand in hand.
The last part of Law’s Virtues (chapters 8–10) addresses voters, and Kaveny
is respectfully critical of the recent bishops’ published guides, in which the
issue of abortion is prioritized to such an extent that it eclipses issues of the
economy, poverty, education, food policy, housing, military expenditures, violence, labor rights, immigration, and caring for the environment. If abortion
is made an absolute priority, a difficulty arises “from the fact that changing
the status [quo] does not score nearly as high [as other issues] on the scales
of urgency, amenability to improvement, or ripeness for intervention” from
federal courts (p. 207). No elected official can make an immediate change,
and Kaveny questions the effectiveness of a strategy aimed at the president’s
ability to choose Supreme Court justices. Even if Roe v. Wade were overruled,
many states would legalize abortion, and women with crisis pregnancies
could travel to those states. Therefore, the economy should be a key pro-life
concern, because “the number of abortions is correlated…to the economic
and social circumstances of women facing crisis pregnancies” (p. 209). Moreover, “staggering” healthcare costs for the growing elderly population renews
pressure to legalize physician-assisted suicide (p. 209).
I especially appreciated Kaveny’s critique of the extremist discourse in the
“culture wars,” which leads voters into a oversimplified, binary framework
treating actions as either so morally objectionable to be criminally prohibited,
or so “morally good [to be] federally funded, and widely practiced” (p. 273).
Rhetorical and evocative use of the terms “intrinsic evil” (theologically, an
analytically technical term that “says nothing about the comparative gravity of the act” in question [p. 221]) and “complicity with evil” (conceptually
unsound in relation to a voter’s responsibility [p. 244]) should be tempered. In
Kaveny’s view, taking into account the common good:
[A] solitary vote for a pro-choice politician is not likely to make
any significant difference to any particular woman’s [constitution-
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ally protected] decision for or against abortion…[V]oters might well
judge that voting for a candidate who supports a large safety net for
mothers and dependent children would be a better way to increase the
number of children brought to term. (p. 256)
In any event, these matters deserve a “nuanced, respectful discussion that is
not easily facilitated in the rhetoric and mind-set of the ‘culture wars’” (p. 275).
My only criticism of Law’s Virtues is the absence of any detailed analysis of recent controversies over insurance coverage for medical birth control
and the legalization of gay marriage, issues that are both divisive among
voters and relevant to the scope of Kaveny’s study. Others will be critical of
her pragmatism, but I take to heart her recommendation that, in the public
square, Christians should “try to be teachers rather than warriors” (p. 276).
David S. Caudill is a Professor of Law and the Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair
at Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania. Correspondence
regarding this book review can be sent to Dr. Caudill at caudill@law.villanova.edu

